Friday 6 January 2012

The Conquest of Mexico by Gillian Hammerton

What were the contributing factors, including military tactics, which made the Conquest of Mexico possible?by Gillian Hammerton

The conquest of Mexico from the point of view of the indigenous population.
I will focus certain relevant aspects to explain Motecuhzoma hesitancy to the invasion of the Spaniards in 1519 I Reed and the events which led to his indecision, which Smith (2007: 278) maintains was a contributing factor to the downfall and conquest of the Aztecs. I will also focus on the troops, weapons and battlefield tactics of warfare of the indigenous troops and the Spanish forces and the ability of the native warriors to adapt and neutralise aspects of the Spanish cavalry, rather than focus on the campaign’s history. Additionally I will consider Cortés strategy of building up strategic allegiances with oppressed and discontented indigenous tributees. I will submit that had Cortés not constructed his native allegiances he would have been defeated by the supremacy of numbers of the Aztecs forces but, by his allegiance with the Tlaxcalans and other allies, he presented a cohesive indigenous and Spanish force against a traditional Aztec army, with intent on killing and conquering rather than capture. This alliance between 500 Spanish troops and tens of thousands of native allies provided a powerful combination of resistance. Essentially I submit that two Aztec armies were pitted against each other. A further compounding factor in the historical context of the conquests of Mexico according to Smith (2007: 279) was the devastation caused by the epidemic of smallpox which gradually eventually had devastating effects on the population of Tenochtitlan on the “native diplomatic and military capacities precisely as Cortés prepared to renew his assault on Tenochtitlan” (McCaa1995: 409).
Motecuhzoma
Motecuhzoma’s conduct and especially his hesitancy in initially repelling the Spaniards invaders, has been judged harshly and considered central in the defeat of the Aztec empire and Motecuhzoma represented as being the “helpless toy of the Spanish leading them to his treasures each holding him, each grasping him’ as they looted and pillaged at will” (Clendinnen1991:70, 71) (Florentine Codex, 12, 16.17–18,45,48-49).Umberger (2009) claims that it is important to refocus upon Motecuhzoma’s actions, not simply within the context of the representation of the conquest after the event, such as Diego’s Duran’s “History of the Aztecs” and of modern scholars, but to use the omens, ceremonies the colonial written records of the period and pictorial sources and stone monuments created by the Aztecs. The sculptures were created during the unfolding of events and illustrate the focus of contemporary Aztecs concern, while later sculptures and additions of the Aztecs reveal modification of these historical events and by these means “to reconstruct the processes of Aztec historical thought” to help explain why the Spanish arrival in 1 Reed so unhinged Motecuhzoma. Motecuhzoma was excessively preoccupied with his devotion to the gods and was concerned with the failure of Ahuitzotl, his predecessor, and was determined to reverse Ahuitzotl’s policies which he felt had offended and violated against the gods (Conrad 2001: 60-62). Towards the end of his reign Ahuitzotl determined to build an aqueduct but this project coincided with heavy rainy season and resulted in the flooding of Tenochtitlan for which the ruler was held responsible.(see fig 1)
The year1519 was held by the Aztec mind to be an important and fateful year. Motecuhzoma was cognisant that the end of a 52 years cycle was an early event in his reign and fearful that the world might end and the sun not rise. Just before the invasion by the Spaniards,Motecuhzoma had been plagued by a series of ill omen, portents and natural phenomena which in Aztec historical thoughts could be interpreted as signifiers of impending future disasters which Motecuhzoma was determined not to misinterpret(Umberger 2009) (Valliant1941: 241).(see fig 2).
These including the temple of Huitzilopochtlis spontaneously bursting into flames, the wind lashing the water so that it boiled, plagues of locusts and solar eclipses (Umberger 2009) (Leon-Portilla, 1962 pp 4-7). Motecuhzoma’s conduct and especially his hesitancy towards the Spaniards invaders should be reanalysed in the light of Aztec historic thought and of the Aztecs cultural belief system which prohibited violation against the gods and behove a ruler to “negotiate effectively with the supernatural forces”( Umberger 2009). During the early part of the previous cycle 40 years earlier in 1Rabbit 1454 the Great Famine had occurred and Motecuhzoma was determined not to violate the warnings of the gods. Smith (2007: 278) maintains that Motecuhzoma’s indecision towards the initial Spaniard forces should be seen in the contacts of the clash of two alien civilisations and their differing cultural belief systems..
. Hassig(1995 : 242,244)argues that Motecuhzoma’s hesitancy can be more reasonably explained in terms of the understanding of power and its perception in the context of Mesoamerican warfare, for in such context invading forces are inhibited from unannounced invasions, hence Cortés declaration of peaceful intent would be seen as a nullification of potential hostility, particularly bearing in mind that being harvest time their was a preoccupation for agrarian concerns.
Cortés
Cortés initial expeditional force comprised 100 sailors and 500 soldiers who had set sail with him, adventurers including veterans of early voyages, legally and emotionally bound to the Spanish crown, but out to make their fortunes (Townsend 1992:15) but by time of the destruction of Tenochtitlan, Cortés army had swelled to overwhelming proportions, due to his ingenious strategic alliances with indigenous disaffected tributees of the Aztec empire. These alliances between Spanish troops and tens of thousands of native allies which resulted from the politically astute use of the oppressed indigenous populations , discontent and rebellious against the Aztecs tributary system of human sacrifice, provided a powerful combination of resistance. Regardless of weaponry I submit that if Cortés had not forged these indigenous alliances his campaign must surely have failed as he would have been unable to combat the sheer numbers of Aztec warriors mustering against his forces. Cortés was able to incorporate the tactical strategies of the Spanish forces with their intent on killing and conquest, with that of their Tlaxcala and other allies, incorporating their manpower, battle strategies, philosophies and motives and thus able to out focus an Aztec army whose strategies of war depended on philosophies of capture rather than kill. The timing of Cortes entry into Tenochtitlan being towards the end of the Aztecs harvest season was fortuitous because, though the elite warriors would have been available, the bulk of the army of commoners would have been tending the harvest, hence would have been vulnerable to retreating within their city (Hassig 1995: 243). Another factor which should be considered is that Cortés deprived his troops of an escape route by sinking his own ships at Cempoala, thus they had to conquer the Aztecs or die in the process (Hassig 1995).
Spanish Alliances
The Spanish conquest of Tenochtitlan was achieved by the active support of the Tlaxcalans through alliance and corroboration, the historical context of which is described in the Lienzo de Tlaxcala (c1979) which presents the Tlaxcala viewpoint of these events. Tenochtitlan resented the growing power of the merchants’ class in Tlaxcala and saw it as potential threat.
Having first met the Spaniards in battle, the Tlaxcala sought an alliance with them in order to end the domination of Tenochtitlan with whom hostilities had generated during the rule of Motecuhzoma Xocoyotzin‘s style of governance. As Lienzo (c1979: 23) describes, the winds of rebellion were sweeping throughout the empire. For instance in Tetzcocan Motecuhzoma had generated conflict and resentment by imposing his nephew Cacamatzin to usurp the legitimate successor to the throne.
Cortes learning of this indigenous discontent and hostility was able to exploit it and, after various encounters with the Tlaxcalans, was able to obtain their collaboration and support with his campaign. As Lienzo (c1979:12) maintains, the Tlaxcalans hatred of Tenochtitlan was intense and the inhabitants were exhausted by their recent struggles with them and hence they welcomed the opportunity of an allegiance with the Spaniards, having heard about the effectiveness of Spanish soldiers in battle and been appraised of their victories in the Tabasco territory.
Cortés motivation as a Christian with a lust for gold was gold, god’s glory and new land and wealth for King Charles of Spain. A Christian but with a lust for gold and he held it was their Christian duty to relieve Motecuhzoma of his gold to save his soul.
Malintzin, Marina
Malintzin or Dona Marina, a slave girl, was given to Cortés by the Tabasco after their defeat in battle as part of a gift of submission . She was born an Aztec princess and, knew how the Aztecs with their sophisticated society and its sophisticated belief system, functioned. She knew both the Chontal Mayan and the Nahuatl language and was able to act as a translator for Cortés. Marina also became Cortés consort and bore his child (Townsend 1992: 16).(see fig 3)
Spanish weaponry and battlefield practices
The unfamiliar marshal practices of the invading Spaniards would have had a profound and debilitating psychologically terrifying effect on the Aztecs forces who were completely unaccustomed to this type of enemy. Cortes, as Diaz put it, created “a new kind of warfare” for the Aztecs, one of “exemplary cruelty” (Clendinnen1991:83).The Spanish were tutored into a radically different style warfare from the Aztecs. Mesoamerican tactics of warfare were unlike the European traditions and included the announcing the intention prior to hostilities by invading forces, one to one fighting and, unlike the Spanish, the determination to capture for later sacrifice to the gods rather than killing the opponent on the battlefield. Cortes utilised the Aztecs’ determination to acquiring captives by withdrawing then suddenly turning on the pursuers in ambush.
Spanish Weaponry
Lienzo (c1979: 52) depicts the Spanish costume, formal coats, vests, doublets, trousers, stockings, boots and sandals. The pictorial documents also show the complete suit this of armour with mail coats, helmets and shin guards and horses complete with saddles with decorated reins and harnesses, weapons include lances, standards, trumpets and As Lienzo (c1979: 52) states “Cortés was armed small artillery appropriate for conquests in land with inhabitants with ignorance of firearms.” Though The Tlaxcalans carried obsidian knives Lienzo also shows them brandishing Spanish swords.
The Spaniards had superior new and strange weaponry which were lethal and noisy. They included cannon, gunpowder muskets, steel swords, crossbows, armoury, and savage fighting mastiff dogs and horses totally alien to and never before seen by the Aztecs. Clendinnen (1991:82) suggests the battle ferocious Spanish horses to have been a “key element in Cortés’s mystification program.” As the cavalry entered the battle action facing swords and clubs they obtained a psychological and physical advantage (See Fig 4). However, the intimidating nature of the use of cavalry horses dissipated when Tlaxcala warriors managed to kill two horses revealing their mortality. The quantification of fear is difficult to evaluate from each side. Each was fighting an unknown enemy with unknown weaponry and tactics, while in addition the Spanish were fighting in unfamiliar terrain. Though gunpowder and cannon and gun fire was terrifying for the indigenous forces, they adapted by dodging the impacts of these weapons (Leon-Portilla 1962: 96, 97).Likewise the Spanish would have particular terror at the prospect of death by sacrifice to a pagan god, however their native allies would neither fear Spanish weaponry and be less subjected to intimidation by death in battle or subsequent sacrifice (Clendinnen1991: 80, 81).

Aztec Weapons and Armoury
Lienzo (c1979: 52) depicts the Indians in distinct garments according to their rank, the lords having blanket cloaks with borders and designs, sandals with heels and special headdresses. All warriors wore loincloths. The principal defensive weapon of the warrior was the shield (chimalli) made from wickerwork and covered with hide, and according to status adorned with elaborate artistry or feathers. The Aztecs’ main offensive weapons were wooden clubs embedded with sharp obsidian blades, the javelin, bows and arrows, spears and slings (See fig 5). They carried crests or standards mounted on a frame (cacaxlli) tied to their bodies. Aztec body armour was made of quilted cotton which was soaked in brine. It covered the whole body and was an effective protection against missiles and clubs. In fact the Spanish soldiers acquired this usage in preference to their European steel armour, extolling it as lighter and cooler (Valliant 1941:217).
Some Aztecs warriors donned elaborately carved wooden helmets which were decorative more than protective.
Aztecs warfare
Aztec warriors had a lifetime of combat philosophy and experience their exposure to war beginning in childhood witnessing gladiatorial combat, training in specific weaponry and participating in flower wars from an early age. Aztecs warfare was dominated by ritual and ceremony. When no active campaign of warfare was in progress, ceremonial combat would take place between warriors and the purpose of these ritualistic conflicts or “flower wars” was capture. Battle was for the Aztecs a sacred contest between opponents warriors matched for valour and worth, each adorned in ceremonial costume. A warrior captured was given in sacrifice to the gods and would pass to a special heaven. The victorious warrior was given special prestige and his status improved by the number of captives. Such ceremonial battlefield practices had no place in warfare with the Spaniards whose intent was to kill and conquer. However, as (Clendinnen1991: 77) states, during the last stages of the conquests the Aztecs were less inhibited against killing during battle.
Military tactics
As Hassig (1995: 237) states that “the superiority of Spanish technology was not immediately obvious [despite their] cannons, guns, crossbows, steel blade, horses and war dogs” The Aztec strategy was to surround and assail the enemy from all sides using their numeral superiority. Their main offensive weapons were projectile weapons, spears and clubs. Spanish favoured open field battle conditions for the best use of their guns, cavalry and their mounted lancers. The Aztecs tactics to counter these conditions were to withdrawal from open terrain to ravines and towns where they were able to conceal buried pits of spikes and where the horses were vulnerable to uneven ground caused by the flagstones. The horses were also vulnerable to attack from below and panic from hails of stones and missiles. The Aztecs would counteract the cavalry charges by seizing their lances and capturing their crossbows. They would lash swords to poles or lances using them to dislodge the cavalry and disable their horses. During the rainy season cavalry manoeuvres proved difficult in the muddy conditions created during the rain the season (Hassig 1995:238), with “slithering or cold cramped or foundering horses, wet powder, [and] the brutal weight of cannon (Clendinnen1991: 77). The Spanish were also physically disadvantaged in their full metal jacket. The Aztecs lured the Spaniards into an ambush traps (Leon-Portilla 1962: 110), however, the Spanish would use close quarter interaction for firing their guns.
The conquest of Mexico was the result of a powerful clash of cultures of two alien civilisations.
Cortés’s genius is that he turned the rebellion and discontent of the tributees of Tenochtitlan, into a cohesive indigenous and Spanish allegiance force against which the Aztecs were defeated. Essentially two indigenous armies were pitted against each other .I submit, that because of the supremacy of numbers Cortés would not have had the capacity to conquer the Aztec without his alliances,however,the alliance between 500 Spanish troops and tens of thousands of native allies provided a powerful combination of resistance.